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LABOUR STANDARDS IN A GLOBALISED ECONOMY SYMPOSIUM
How can customers 
promote labour standards?
A realistic view on the capacity of social labelling
Among the most important forms of private initiatives for 
the protection and promotion of labour standards are social 
labelling schemes implemented by NGOs. These are for 
example Goodweave (formerly known as Rugmark), Fairtrade
and the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC). Social labelling 
schemes have been spreading rapidly since the 1990s and 
the academic debate has grown along with it. The 
controversial question has been: Are social labelling schemes 
actually effective? Many authors (most recently Axel Marx 
and Jan Wouters) have suggested that social labelling 
schemes are supposed to enforce labour standards in supply 
chains. Accordingly, social labelling schemes are assumed to 
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be “effective” if they meet this condition. However, in view of 
the limited resources of NGOs in relation to the complexity 
of today’s supply chains, this assumption appears to 
overestimate the capacity of social labelling schemes. It 
rather becomes obvious that their capacity is restricted to 
market-based incentives. We therefore might be able to 
better understand social labelling if we look at it from an 
economic perspective. Ultimately, a regulatory approach will 
be necessary to overcome the current weaknesses of 
labelling schemes.
The idea of minimizing asymmetric information in the 
market
Imagine you are in a supermarket and you would like to buy 
a pack of orange juice. Your decision which one to take 
might be influenced by the particular ingredients in the 
juice. These can be taken from the packaging. Some contain 
additives, others do not. Would this information influence 
your decision? Probably yes. At the same time, information 
about the production of the orange juice is not conveyed to 
you. However, some orange juice is produced under good 
social conditions and other orange juice is produced under 
bad social conditions. Would you still buy the chosen one, 
without knowing to which category it belongs to? Probably 
yes. What if information about the production was given? 
Would this information influence your decision as well? 
Probably yes. This scenario is inspired by the theory of 
George Akerlof on asymmetric information in the market, for 
which he received the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2001. In 
his paper The Market for “Lemons” (1970), Akerlof uses 
“lemons” – which are basically used cars with poor quality – 
as an example to explain the effect of information 
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asymmetries in the market. Akerlof’s theory provides a 
useful framework to understand social labelling.
Due to internationally dispersed production customers 
might not be familiar with social conditions in production. 
Social labels aim to provide this information for customers, 
as they are based on the idea that equal levels of information 
enable customers to decide in favour of those products 
which have been produced under good social 
conditions. Meanwhile, a lack of this information might 
rather render a decision in favour of products which are 
cheaper but actually produced under bad social conditions. 
In terms of Akerlof’s theory, an adverse selection of “high 
quality products” (meaning produced under good social 
condition) might be caused. This is obviously not how an 
efficient market is supposed to work. In order to avoid this 
market inefficiency, social labelling schemes aim to minimize 
the information asymmetry between customers and 
producers and thereby turn the selection in favour of “high 
quality products”. In this sense, social labelling schemes will 
be “effective” if they minimize the information asymmetry 
between customers and producers. Based on this 
understanding, are social labelling schemes effective then?
The limitations of social labelling schemes
Applying this framework to analyse Goodweave , Fairtrade
and the FSC, it becomes apparent that their effectiveness is 
limited in various aspects.
In the case of Goodweave the monitoring system is a point 
of concern. Goodweave is unable to monitor the entire 
carpet belt to ensure that the labelled carpets have not been 
produced with illegal child work. The informative value of 
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the Fairtrade label is limited, given its system of distribution 
of benefits. There is no enforcement mechanism to ensure 
that workers subordinated to farmers equitably share in 
benefits. Last but not least, the FSC affirms that the labelled 
wood products have been produced in compliance with 
environmental and social standards. Yet, it is questionable 
whether the FSC can guarantee that the conditions in 
production have been audited with high performance. The 
FSC itself does not carry out the certification process. 
Instead, it accredits third certification bodies, which are 
commercial firms competing over prices, therefore audit 
costs, and therefore audit quality.
In each case an information asymmetry between producers 
and the implementing organizations remains and inevitably 
passes on to customers. At the same time, by giving ‘’big 
promises’’ to customers, an information asymmetry between 
the implementing organizations themselves and customers 
is maintained, which can turn into mistrust once customers 
realize this gap. How can these limitations be overcome in 
order to make social labelling schemes more effective? What 
is needed to make social labelling schemes live up to their 
normative purpose as can be derived from Akerlof’s theory?
A possible solution: A regulatory approach
Basically, social labelling schemes need to be more 
transparent. They have to confine their evaluation to what 
they can really ensure. In pursuit of this, standards for labels 
might be useful. The labels would need to comply with these 
standards when being affixed on products. This is not a call 
for “standards for standards”, meaning that the standards for 
production circumstances, which the companies are 
required to comply with in order to receive a label, shall be 
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standardized among different labelling schemes. The 
standards, on which the organizations base their operations, 
must remain at their discretion, and depend on the 
organizations’s objectives and resources. Instead, the 
standards proposed here are meant to regulate the 
information given by the labels as such, in other words the 
“outcomes” of the labelling schemes. These standards could 
require, for instance, that labels need to reveal the stage of 
the supply chain up to which they can guarantee to have 
overseen all crucial aspects like the production, the 
distribution of benefits and the certification. In the end, this 
requirement can strengthen the reliability of social labels.
Moreover, revealing information on the percentage of supply 
chain stages that have been overseen with certainty would 
incentivise producers to give auditors for social labels a 
deeper look into their supply chain, since producers would 
then compete for transparency. For example, producer A 
made 80% of its supply chain transparent, whereas producer 
B already revealed 95%. The difference in their capacities 
may also legitimize different prices, since more 
sophisticated implementation efforts are costlier. So, the 
more capable the labelling scheme is, the higher the 
product’s price could be. Ideally, the “selection” according to 
Akerlof could then be turned in favour of products with 
strongly enforceable labels.
Hence, legal regulation of social labels might be a possible 
solution for achieving transparency and certainty, as both 
aspects are core competences of law. Further research from 
a legal point of view is necessary in order to consider in 
what way such regulation could be established.
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